This essay aims to analyse if the Russian military operation carried out against Georgia between the 7th and 12th of august 2008 were executed with adherence to the Russian principles for military deception, Maskirovka.   A superior purpose is to assess the situation according to the Swedish Armed Forces task of identifying possible needs for new or changed needs for abilities and competence.   The method used is two-alternative hypotheses which are tried by comparing actual events before and during the Russian-Georgian war with the ten methods of maskirovka, compiled from military analytical literature. Such traces of resemblance are further examined, both individually and as a part of a larger indication.   Further the essay describes the Russian art of war, the prerequisites for military surprise, information warfare in Russian doctrine, the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the principles for Maskirovka.   The conclusion is that the Russian operation was executed with some adherence to maskirovka, though unspecified of to what degree.   Author of this essay is Cadet Martin Svensson of the Swedish Army, currently a student at the Armed Forces Technical School in Halmstad..

The Russian operation on the Crimean peninsula has been referred to as a victory enabled by the operationalization of the concept of New Generation Warfare. According to some military theorists, this concept and its operationalization cannot be characterized in terms of the traditional wars waged up to this point. It is, however, also argued that this new generation of warfare is primarily a new approach to strategy, a new way of applying traditional methods to achieve political goals. The purpose of this study is to discern whether Russia employed strategic deception in its operation in Crimea and if this is the case; what methods and principles were used and if these can be explained using a traditional view of deception. The application of theories on deception by Michael Dewar and Barton S.

Undersökningens syfte är att pröva om en mindre stat kan nyttja sig av vilseledning för att minska åverkan från en motståndare som nyttjar sig av Wardens systemteori. Undersökningen fokuserar främst på att vilseleda en motståndares målinhämtning innan ett angrepp. Undersökningen ger förslag på ett antal sätt att genomföra defensiv vilseledning, både innan ett angrepp och under påbörjat angrepp. För att underlätta för undersökningen tas fiktiva målval ut inom Sverige med stöd av Wardens litteratur och med stöd i viss annan litteratur. En mindre jämförelse mot befintliga sårbarhetsanalyser genomförs.