Background: Theoretical, it?s been questioned why dividends exists in companies based upon the fact that there is a separation between ownership and control. According to the agency theoretical perception, dividends is used as a manner to unify the interest of this separation, which in turn lower the agency cost, and increase the efficiency of companies.Purpose: The aim of this master thesis is to scrutinize and analyse the association between Swedish firms? owner structure and owner types and their inclination to dividend.Method: We attack the problem with a hypothetical-deductive research method by using the existence of a universal theory, the agency theory. From our theoretical framework we propose a set of hypotheses.

This paper investigates the relationship between dividends and institutional and foreign ownership in Swedish firms. We use a dataset which covers the Swedish stock market over the period 1999-2009. The institutional ownership is defined as mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies and these are analysed separately. The study confirms the expected positive relationship between the level of institutional investors in a firm and the size of dividends. We also confirm? the expected negative relationship between foreign investors and the size of dividends paid by Swedish firms.

This study examines whether the ownership structure of Swedish firms contributes to explain the variations in executive pay. A regression analysis was performed on 102 companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The analysis suggests a negative relationship between ownership structure and executive pay after taking company profitability and size into account. The result is in line with previous studies and the agency theory. This indicates that large shareholders have a stronger position in Swedish companies or that large shareholders monitor the management to a larger extent, rather than providing incentives.

Följande studie analyserar utdelningspolitiken hos familjeföretag under åren 2004-2014. Studien är uppdelad i två steg. Första steget syftar till att svara på frågan om familjeföretag har en högre utdelningsnivå än icke-familjeföretag. Steg två undersöker huruvida ett aktivt ägande påverkar utdelningarna hos familjeföretag. Studien baseras på en totalundersökning av företag som under våren 2015 var noterade på Nasdaq OMX Stockholms Large-, Mid- och Small-Cap.

Active ownership is widely regarded as positive for the development and performance of businesses. In this paper, we investigate the impact of ownership concentration and owner identity on return on equity (ROE) in Swedish companies between 1986 and 2008, and show that active ownership might suffer from opposing effects. We find evidence, albeit weak, that ownership concentration has a positive effect on profitability, but that it levels off at high levels of ownership shares. Furthermore, we propose that family ownership has a negative effect on profitability. Our results are dependent of choice of statistical method, but show nonetheless a need to reevaluate what seems to be a universally positive view of active ownership..

In the light of some company scandals the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, the Code, was introduced in the year of 2004 to reinforce confidence in how Swedish listed companies are managed. As many of the other European codes of corporate governance, the Swedish Code is based on the principle of ?comply or explain?. The need for corporate governance regulation arises from the inherent conflict of interest between owners and managers. This conflict is limited in companies controlled by a family in contrast to companies that lack a strong owner.

In family firms altruistic effects can arise in order to preserve the ownership of the firm within the family. The family firm may chose to carry or take measures against these effects. Regardless, it will lead to different agent costs. Therefore, the aims of the study were to explain how altruistic effects in family firms exert an influence on the administrative systems and possible counter measures.In order to explain the origin of altruistic effects, we built a theory which showed that the altruistic effects were followed by agent costs. The family can take measures to counteract these original effects.

Master Thesis in Business Administration, School of Business Administration, Linaeus University, Finance 4FE03E, Spring 2011Authors: Benni Hansson, Axel SandquistTutor: Christopher von KochExaminer: Sven-Olof CollinTitle: Compensation as a means of monitoring or recruiting ? a study on ownership structure in Swedish listed companies.Keywords: CEO compensation, compensation structure, ownership structure, ownership types, ownership concentration, agency theory, resource dependence theory, managerial theoryBackground: There has been extensive research on CEO compensation, however not a lot on Swedish listed firms. Many studies have an agency theoretical perception on CEO compensation. In accordance with this, compensation is used as a means to solve monitoring and incentives problems.Purpose: The aim of this study is to examine the role of CEO compensation, by studying ownership structure.Method: To examine the role of CEO compensation we use a multi-theory approach, based on agency theory, resource dependence theory and managerial theory. The companies examined are Swedish listed firms the in years 2005 to 2009.

Venture capital firms and private equity firms have been the subject of much controversy in the last decade. During this period economies throughout the world have seen a steady increase of these types of firms as owners of companies. In Sweden this has certainly been the case and many argue that this trend will continue to grow stronger in the future. This trend is by many regarded as dangerous and as a threat to the ownership model that has characterized the Swedish economy for decades. Family ownership has been widely regarded as the most beneficial and responsible ownership model in Sweden.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the competitiveness of family firms is affected by governance mechanisms. The thesis addresses four governance mechanisms: inefficient labor markets, inefficient capital markets, self control and altruism. We have conducted an abductive method to be able to perform a qualitative research study. In this study two family firms have been examined, ROL and Indiska Magasinet. We conclude that the presence of inefficient labor and capital markets within the studied family firms give rise to negative effects in terms of difficulties of hiring talented employees.

The last few decades largeincreases in institutional and foreign ownershipin Swedish listed companies have created a concernthat the traditionalSwedish ownership model are disappearing.With increasing globalizationand ever morecapital-intensive markets, so have great owners forced to admitcapital fuelled institutionaland foreign investors into their companies. By from an agency theoryperspective examine how different ownershiptypes and ownershipconstellations affects the cost ofequity, we want to see if there is reason for concern. Is the change in ownership structure affecting theSwedish listed firms?Our results show that the owneridentity or ownership constellations don?t affect the cost of equity that much.The only owner-identity that shows a significant correlation with the cost ofequity is the institutions and they relate to a lower cost of equity. Theresults show that companies with two controlling shareholders relates to lowercost of equity which can show that ownership structure affects the cost.

The relationship between dividend policy and investment is a controversial area and the relationship between these two may differ depending on the company's priorities. The study examines this more closely by studying dividend policy's impact on investment and how it differs depending on the company?s market capitalization. The study is based on companies listed on the OMX Stockholm within the segments Large Cap and Small Cap, during the period between 2003-2012. Secondary data was obtained from each company's annual reports where relevant data was used to operationalized into measurable variables.

This study presents a survey of the capital budgeting methods used in investment decisions by selected Swedish firms. The study has a qualitative approach where the main goal is to increase the understanding of why firms use ?incorrect? capital budgeting methods like the payback method despite the well known fact that it is one of the most faulty methods, according to literature in business finance (Brealey. Myers). The study has specially researched the impact of company?s size, investments size, ownership structure, branch traditions and political risks influence on firms capital budgeting..

The purpose of this study explains the relationship between corporate governance and the auditor's role in Swedish family firms with the definitions micro, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and how this relationship is affected by the firms strategy. The study is based on a survey sent out to 3000 Swedish SMEs, of which 280 responses from family firms could be used. Our findings showed that the auditor in the family firms didn?t have a specific role or contributed added value to the firm, and that the strategy didn?t affect the outcome. Furthermore, we found correlation between the perceptions of the auditor's role and added value depending on the family firms type of corporate governance.

Background: In the current labor and business policy debate in Sweden there is a major focus on the need for it to become easier to set up small firms, and that it needs to become easier for small firms to hire staff. In order to set up and run a business, funding is required. Firms can choose to work more or less actively with this issue, but they all need to relate to it. There are basically two ways to fund a business, either through equity or through debt. The ratio between these two sources is called the firm?s capital structure.Purpose: To chart the capital structure of small firms in Sweden.