Ersättningen som övervakning eller rekrytering
En studie utifrån ägarstruktur i svenska börsbolag
Ersättning till VDErsättningsstrukturägarstrukturägarkategorierägarkoncentrationAgentteoriResursbehovsteoriManagerial theory
Master Thesis in Business Administration, School of Business Administration, Linaeus University, Finance 4FE03E, Spring 2011Authors: Benni Hansson, Axel SandquistTutor: Christopher von KochExaminer: Sven-Olof CollinTitle: Compensation as a means of monitoring or recruiting ? a study on ownership structure in Swedish listed companies.Keywords: CEO compensation, compensation structure, ownership structure, ownership types, ownership concentration, agency theory, resource dependence theory, managerial theoryBackground: There has been extensive research on CEO compensation, however not a lot on Swedish listed firms. Many studies have an agency theoretical perception on CEO compensation. In accordance with this, compensation is used as a means to solve monitoring and incentives problems.Purpose: The aim of this study is to examine the role of CEO compensation, by studying ownership structure.Method: To examine the role of CEO compensation we use a multi-theory approach, based on agency theory, resource dependence theory and managerial theory. The companies examined are Swedish listed firms the in years 2005 to 2009. The data has been gathered from annual reports, Fristedt and Sundqvist?s books ?Ägarna och makten i Sveriges börsföretag?, and the Datastream database. The data has been statistically analyzed to reach our conclusions.Conclusions: We find a correlation between ownership structure and compensation and the use of options. Families use the lowest level of compensation and have the lowest use of options. Institutional investors offer the highest level compensation while foreign investors have the highest propensity to use options. We do not find a relationship between industrial investors and level of compensation. We argue that both compensation and options first and foremost is a result of the level and quality of the monitoring. The compensation policy is used as a means to solve monitoring problems. We also argue that the CEO gains power with absent owners, and can thereby influence the salary.