Ägarstrukturens påverkan på tillämpningen av Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning
En studie av bolagsstyrningsrapporter
Agency theory corporate governance ownership role ownership structure the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance
In the light of some company scandals the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, the Code, was introduced in the year of 2004 to reinforce confidence in how Swedish listed companies are managed. As many of the other European codes of corporate governance, the Swedish Code is based on the principle of ?comply or explain?. The need for corporate governance regulation arises from the inherent conflict of interest between owners and managers. This conflict is limited in companies controlled by a family in contrast to companies that lack a strong owner. From an agency theory perspective we postulate that the ownership structure influences the application of the Code. Our hypothesis is that the companies controlled by a family diverge more from the Code than companies that lack a strong ownership structure. To test our hypothesis we investigated corporate governance reports from twentyone Swedish listed companies, of which eight lacked an owner with a strong influence and thirteen that were controlled by a family. The study results confirmed that the companies controlled by a family diverge from the Code to a greater extent than the companies that lack an owner of great influence and by applying a non-parametric test we were able to accept our hypothesis. The limited need of monitoring in the companies controlled by a family was judged to be the main reason for the differences in the application of the Code.