Värden för demokratin eller demokrati för värden
En idéanalys av sambandet mellan begreppen folkvilja och värde i tre demokratiuppfattningar
VärdenFolkviljaVärdeteoriDemokratiPluralistisk demokratiDeliberativ demokratiKonstitutionell demokrati
This essay examines a presupposed correlation between the way one look upon values and the way one look upon the will of the people in a theoretical democratic context. The more specific purpose is to test the following hypothesis: There is a reversed connection between the way one look upon values and the way one look upon the will of the people in a theoretical democratic context, that is; a strong claim of values give reason to a limited conception of the will of the people and a weak claim of values gives reason for a more unlimited conception of the will of the people.In order to test the hypothesis I examine three different conceptions of democracy, these are: pluralist democracy, deliberative democracy and constitutional democracy. I analyze the way they look upon values, there view of the will of the people and finally if there is a connection between the way they look upon values and the will of the people. Values should be understood in a metaethical context. In other words it is not values in the ?common? meaning, instead its how val-ues in them selves should be understood, and even more relevant, what we mean when we ex-press values.My conclusions are, first and foremost, that there is a correlation between the will of the people and values, according to the formulation of the hypothesis. This leaves, for that specific issue, two alternatives; a weak conception of values with a strong conception of the will of the people, and, a strong conception of values with a weak conception of the will of the people. I also conclude that there are problems with both alternatives. A weak conception of values could result in moral diffi-culties, such as a majority oppresses a minority. And a strong conception of values could result in an excavation of democracy.As for the conceptions of democracy, I conclude that the pluralistic democracy has a relativistic view on values and an (more or less) unlimited conception of the will of the people. The delibera-tive democracy has a similar conception with a few exceptions. The constitutional democracy have a somewhat relativistic conception of values but with objectivistic elements, and hence a limited conception of the will of the people.