Agency theory describes the conflict of interest between the principal (stockholders) and the agent (CEO). Aligning the incentives of executives with those of the owners is the most direct way to mitigate the agency problem. If there is no meaningful link between CEO compensation and company performance, it is doubtful that the large sums of assets in public corporations are being managed efficiently. In theory the solution is simple reward the CEO when shareholders wealth increases. The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is a relationship between company performance and CEO compensation among Swedish companies, in materials and information technology industry.

This essay aims to examine how Swedish compulsory school teachers claims to handle dyslexia while educating and grading, and to what extent they are influenced by others while grading. This was examined through interviews with a phenomenographic approach and the participants were eight grade 9 teachers. The categories of description found in the analysis was then interpreted through researcher Claes Nilhoms dilemma perspective, focusing on the dilemma Equal Participation - Compensation. Regarding education, three main strategies occurred: actions directed towards all students, methods of compensation organized by the school and individualized methods of compensation. The former is closest to Equal Participation, the latter to Compensation and the school organized methods form a middle position somewhat closer to Compensation.

In this report listed buildings, according to the Swedish Heritage Conservation Act, have been studied with a focus on cases where economical compensation has been given to the owner of the building and cases where the listing of the building has been appealed by the owner. In order for a building to become listed it needs to be particularly valuable from a cultural and historical standpoint. The listed buildings are protected through a list of regulations that determines which parts of the building can or cannot be changed, what methods and materials should be used for changes and repairs, and how the building should be maintained. These regulations should as far as possible be formulated in agreement with the owner, but a building can become listed against the owners will. To decrease the damage this causes the owner he can in some cases have the right to economical compensation. There is also a possibility for the owner to appeal the listing of the building.

In this master thesis we are trying to investigate whether the heads of the four major Swedish banks are receiving compensation because of their own performance. We have investigated a number of parameters in the reporting and compensation description of Handelsbanken, Nordea, SEB and Swedbank and compared it to macro data.We have used publicly available information from the banks as well as macro data from 1998 to 2009.We have come to the conclusion that the revenue and profits of the banks are heavily influenced by external factors and that there does not appear to be a clear link between a CEOs actions, the reported results for the bank, the shareholder gains and the compensation for the CEO. It appears as if the bonus payments to a CEO may depend more on parameters beyond the CEOs own control than the performance of the CEO..

In December 2005 the government ordered a group to investigate the compensation law of expropriation. The purpose was to change the law so that it would reflect today?s conditions of expropriation.  The result of the investigation was that some changes were made in the law of expropriation. The aim of the changes was to strengthen the ownership of properties. Following changes was made in august 2010; the deduction of tolerance was rescinded as well as the rule of presumption and a new rule was added saying that the market value/decrease in market value should be multiplied with 25 percent when the compensation was calculated. The aim of this thesis is to investigate how Trafikverket has experienced these changes from 2010.

Master Thesis in Business Administration, School of Business Administration, Linaeus University, Finance 4FE03E, Spring 2011Authors: Benni Hansson, Axel SandquistTutor: Christopher von KochExaminer: Sven-Olof CollinTitle: Compensation as a means of monitoring or recruiting ? a study on ownership structure in Swedish listed companies.Keywords: CEO compensation, compensation structure, ownership structure, ownership types, ownership concentration, agency theory, resource dependence theory, managerial theoryBackground: There has been extensive research on CEO compensation, however not a lot on Swedish listed firms. Many studies have an agency theoretical perception on CEO compensation. In accordance with this, compensation is used as a means to solve monitoring and incentives problems.Purpose: The aim of this study is to examine the role of CEO compensation, by studying ownership structure.Method: To examine the role of CEO compensation we use a multi-theory approach, based on agency theory, resource dependence theory and managerial theory. The companies examined are Swedish listed firms the in years 2005 to 2009.

A global world and international business induces not only opportunities for organizations such as increased possibilities to reach new markets but also challenges to maintain a coherent business. To meet these challenges, organizations need to harbor a global workforce where employees are sent abroad. These employees are called expatriates and receive very lucrative compensation packages to cover their increased expenses. Compensation packages are not only expensive but represent in their totality also a complex strategic challenge for both the organization and the expatriate. The purpose of this paper is to investigate which components of a compensation package that are important for different segments of expatriates.

Today?s wind power plants are only compensated for their reactive power consumption at no-load. As the wind power plants grow bigger the amount of reactive power they need also increases. This is no longer a problem that can be ignored, especially as the net owners are beginning to charge the reactive power they transport.In this thesis a couple of different methods of compensation and their prices will be discussed and evaluated. Problems, such as self-excitation, that can occur if one fully compensates the wind power plant will also be brought to surface.

Today?s wind power plants are only compensated for their reactive power consumption at no-load. As the wind power plants grow bigger the amount of reactive power they need also increases. This is no longer a problem that can be ignored, especially as the net owners are beginning to charge the reactive power they transport.In this thesis a couple of different methods of compensation and their prices will be discussed and evaluated. Problems, such as self-excitation, that can occur if one fully compensates the wind power plant will also be brought to surface.

Today?s wind power plants are only compensated for their reactive power consumption at no-load. As the wind power plants grow bigger the amount of reactive power they need also increases. This is no longer a problem that can be ignored, especially as the net owners are beginning to charge the reactive power they transport.In this thesis a couple of different methods of compensation and their prices will be discussed and evaluated. Problems, such as self-excitation, that can occur if one fully compensates the wind power plant will also be brought to surface.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether institutional ownership has an influence on CEO compensation in companies where the institutions have invested. In order to fulfil the purpose of the thesis a quantitative study was carried out within the Swedish corporate context where we have studied Swedish institutional investors and companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Our period of study was the financial year of 2007.The empirical questions at issue is; Was there a connection between Swedish institutional ownership and the size of the CEO compensation, and, does Swedish institutional ownership lead to a certain type of CEO compensation in terms of structure?Our results did not suggest that an increased institutional ownership neither leads to a certain type of salary level nor a certain kind of salary structure. These results contradict earlier American research, which has been done within this area and has previously shown a secured connection.The reasons for our results may be many and it is difficult to state any concrete conclusions to why we received differing results.

Today?s wind power plants are only compensated for their reactive power consumption at no-load. As the wind power plants grow bigger the amount of reactive power they need also increases. This is no longer a problem that can be ignored, especially as the net owners are beginning to charge the reactive power they transport.In this thesis a couple of different methods of compensation and their prices will be discussed and evaluated. Problems, such as self-excitation, that can occur if one fully compensates the wind power plant will also be brought to surface.

Today?s wind power plants are only compensated for their reactive power consumption at no-load. As the wind power plants grow bigger the amount of reactive power they need also increases. This is no longer a problem that can be ignored, especially as the net owners are beginning to charge the reactive power they transport.In this thesis a couple of different methods of compensation and their prices will be discussed and evaluated. Problems, such as self-excitation, that can occur if one fully compensates the wind power plant will also be brought to surface.

Today?s wind power plants are only compensated for their reactive power consumption at no-load. As the wind power plants grow bigger the amount of reactive power they need also increases. This is no longer a problem that can be ignored, especially as the net owners are beginning to charge the reactive power they transport.In this thesis a couple of different methods of compensation and their prices will be discussed and evaluated. Problems, such as self-excitation, that can occur if one fully compensates the wind power plant will also be brought to surface.

Penalty clauses is a term that can be put in an agreement and is an amount that shall be paid by a part of the agreement if they cause any damage to the other part by breaking the agreement. Penalty clauses have since around 100 years ago had a quite clear meaning in Sweden according to a lot of authors. These authors have the opinion that penalty clauses is an exclusive judgment of the compensation the victim has right to, that means that if the parties have put a lower amount in the clause the victim won?t get full coverage for the damages caused by the other party. That the penalty clause is an exclusive judgment of the victims right to compensation means that the victim doesn?t have the right to request other compensation above the compensation in the clause if nothing else is stated in the clause.A penalty clause may be viewed as a complement to compensation you get according to The Tort Liability Act (1972:206) where it is often difficult to obtain full compensation for damages when it is required that a number of conditions are to be met for damages deleted.