VD
s incitament i form av rörliga ersättningar och dess påverkan på bolagets riskexponering
The recent financial crisis has entailed in a fierce debate whether CEOs variable remuneration has caused unsound risk exposure in public companies. Hence it is considered as interesting to elucidate if this connection exists empirically. With grounding in principal-agent theory, and its implicit assumption of risk adverse agents, this study aims to find empirical evidence for a positively correlated relationship between CEOs variable remuneration and company risk exposure. Through a regression analysis of multidimensional data from 102 listed Swedish companies during the period of 2000-2009, we show that the relationship between CEOs variable remuneration and company risk, in contrast to our expectations, is significantly negative. The coherent result is interpreted as the inherent risk in companies seems to explain the usage of variable remuneration for CEO, rather than vice versa. Hence more risky companies tend to offer less variable remuneration to their CEOs, an effect that is enhanced by an industry comparison. Decisively we argue that variable remuneration within high risk companies can have a tendency to make the CEO more risk averse.