Konstitutionsutskottet och Regeringskontrollen - En studie av kontrollmaktens utövande i enkammarriksdagen 1971-2007
Principal-AgentKonstitutionsutskottetKontrollPolitical and administrative sciencesStatsvetenskapFörvaltningskunskapLaw and Political Science
The purpose of this study is to examine how parliament executes its responsibility of oversight against the government. In Sweden, parliamentary oversight of the government rests with a standing committee of parliament known as the constitutional committee.Drawing on general principal-agent theory I construct a model in which members of the constitutional committee are seen as agents in double and conflicting agency assignments. This constitutes a problem for the agent. Since it is the party group in parliament that controls the fulfilment of the agents? objectives, the agent is presumed to follow the party assignment to the detriment of the parliament assignment.The model generates two hypotheses concerning they type of oversight we should expect the members of the constitutional committee to perform against the government. The hypotheses are then empirically tested against a vast amount of data compiled for three elements of oversight during the unicameral period (1971-2006): the initiative, investigation and findings.The result shows that the hypotheses receive ample support. The most important result is that, in all elements of oversight, members of the constitutional committee are much more inclined to treat their own party government more favourably than they would the antagonist party government.