Konditionalitet, effektivitet och legitimitet. En normativ studie av politisk konditionalitet.
GivareBiståndPolitisk konditionalitetEffektivitetLegitimitetPolitical and administrative sciencesStatsvetenskapFörvaltningskunskapLaw and Political Science
Since the end of the Cold War, foreign aid donors have been using political conditionality to promote human rights, democracy and good governance in recipient countries. This phenomenon has been analyzed and criticized, but mainly from a strictly empirical point of view. In this paper, the legitimacy of political conditionality is analyzed through a normative perspective based on the extrinsic value of efficiency. If the political conditions don?t result in a democratic development, including respect of human rights and good governance, they can not be justified.With at theoretical focus on the donors, based on the unequal relationship between donor and recipient, I am examining the donors? possibility and supposed will to use political conditions in development cooperation. I argue that donors have made political conditionality an ineffective instrument for promoting a democratic development in recipient countries. To be able to justify political conditionality, its efficiency has to improve. This can be done by an improved coordination between donors, as well as between donors and recipients. These actions would equalize the relationship between the parties, synchronize the political conditions and strengthen the local ownership and would thereby improve the prospects of an efficient conditionality.