Inuti den svarta lådan
En studie av beslutsprocesserna bakom EU
Trade was assigned as a Community responsibility at the founding of the European Community in 1957. It was then recognized that Europe would achieve a greater international influence if it were to negotiate trade deals with one voice. Since then, the basic rule has been that the European Commission negotiates agreements on behalf of the EC, and presents the agreements negotiated for approval in the European Council. Today, the 25-member European Union is the largest trading power in the world, and most member states have decades of experience of coordinating their national trade interests into a common position. However, partly as a result of the complex nature of the trade decision-making processes it is sometimes problematic to identify who or what really influences EU trade policy. The purpose of this thesis is to provide increased understanding of EU trade decision-making, applying mainly the framework of new institutional decision theory. In order to achieve this, the question ?What influences EU trade decision-making?? is addressed. The analysis is based on a case study of the controversial ?Singapore Issues? ? four new trade areas for which the EU advocated an international agreement within the World Trade Organization, WTO. Employing a qualitative method, primarily based on seventeen interviews with persons involved in EU trade policy, the study focuses on the period between 1996 and 2004. It is argued that the Commission plays a decisive role in setting the common goals and the political agenda within the EU. The influence of the Commission can partly be explained by a strong formal position as defined in the Treaty. Apart from this, the Commission takes advantage of methods such as ?horse-trading?, informal oppression of minority interests, and ambiguity to overcome the preference heterogeneity among the member states and to promote a common EU position. In a multilateral setting, the Commission, acting on behalf of the EU, has played a different role. After an initial period of proactive behaviour, pushing the Singapore Issues as a skilful policy entrepreneur, the Commission took on a more reactive approach, and finally gave in to external pressure. The need to prove EU as a legitimate leader in the WTO, as well as internal division within the EU, made it difficult for the Commission to neglect the sharp criticism levelled against the Singapore Issues and the EU. In short, the Commission dominates the member states in forming the official EU trade policy. However, the Commission has proven to be rather sensitive to external pressure during the conduct of negotiations, which in turn also shapes the EU position.