Förtroendeproblematik för privata pensionsförsäkringar i Ryssland
EconomicsPensionsföräkringarSpelteoriFörsäkringsbolagFörsäkringstagareRysslandFörtroendeKorruptionNationalekonomi
The first aim of the thesis is to analyse the problems of trust, according to game theory, in the Russian market for private pensions insurance. The second aim is to find suitable strategies to solve the problems. Problems of trust have arisen because, (i) buyers of insurance have had negative experiences when dealing with insurance companies and corruption has decreased trust for all players in the market, (ii) incomplete information makes it difficult to separate honest actors from dishonest, and (iii) dishonest insurance companies do not get punished because of corruption and weaknesses in the law. Mutual risk-sharing is a potential solution as necessary conditions already exist in the Russian society. There are groups who (i) share the same type of risks, (ii) are aware of moral hazards, and (iii) are able to control each other. Mutual risk-sharing gives people in distant areas the possibility to get insurance. Strategies of trust are a possible solution in the long run because of the presence of corruption in the Russian society. The strategies can be implemented by the insurance companies and are thought to lessen the gap of information between them and the insurance buyer. We believe that corruption is the largest threat towards the success of the strategies of trust.