Fenomenologi, ontologi, givenhet
Reduktion och filosofisk metod hos Edmund Husserl och Martin Heidegger
In this thesis I examine how the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger differ with regard to the phenomenological reduction, and in particular why there is no reduction in Sein und Zeit. I examine in what way philosophy is seen as an overcoming of the naïvete of a ?natural? attitude and how this natural attitude is understood, starting with Husserl?s descriptions of the phenomenological reduction, of the natural attitude of our daily lives and of his notion of transcendental subjectivity. By presenting these main aspects, I try to elucidate why, in Husserl?s view, laying the foundation of all knowledge must take form of a phenomenological first philosophy. There is also a short discussion on the problems of communicating the phenomenological reduction in the language of the natural attitude, and why the emphasis on the the negative aspects of the reduction is to some extent rooted in the things themselves. After having outlined the relevant characteristics of Husserl?s phenomenology, I turn to Heidegger?s own phenomenological project and describe the phenomenological method laid forth in Sein und Zeit and his critique of Husserl, mainly in the Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. After that I try to show in what way the analyses in Sein und Zeit function as a corrective to the points of criticism in Prolegomena. I then try to show in what way the phenomenon of Angst plays a similar methodological role to that of the phenomenological reduction in Husserl. Finally, I try to elucidate in what way the concept of In-der-Welt-Sein is a criticism of Husserl?s idea of the transcendental consciousness, and how Heidegger?s project can be seen as an inquire into the conditions for phenomena in general ? that is, not only how the transcendent objects are constituted in the transcendental consciousness, as in Husserl, but rather how things in general can present themselves, including the ?immanent? acts of the consciousness. The self-givenness of consciousness is thus not seen as the point of departure for phenomenology, but rather a problem that needs to be phenomenologically explained.