Demokrati och lagprövning - Om rättfärdigandet av en positiv respektive negativ inställning till lagprövning som institution i demokratin
Judicial reviewDemocracyConstitutionalismRightsSeparation of powersPolitical and administrative sciencesStatsvetenskapFörvaltningskunskapLaw and Political Science
This essay concerns the issue of democracy and judicial review. The main focus is on the justification of both a positive and a negative attitude towards judicial review, and the values these justifications are based on. The analysis is made by textual analysis of four authors with different opinions of the subject matter: Robert Dahl and Jeremy Waldron who has a negative attitude towards judicial review, and Erwin Chemerinsky and Ronald Dworkin who are positive about it. In the analysis an analytic frame is used which consists of different dimensions and aspects of the problem of democracy and judicial review. The study shows that there are important differences in democratic values between a positive and a negative justification of judicial review. There are first of all a difference in the balance between popular government and constitutionalism. There are also differences on the view of the right balance between democracy as; process or substance, rule by the broad mass of the people or rule by an elite, spirit of the community or the rights of the individual. The study also shows differences between the two approaches concerning their view on the important democratic values of liberty and equality.