Att påverka sina preferenser
en analys av rationalitet och preferensdynamik (v 1.1)
Actors deliberately change their preferences, contrary to the assumptions of rational decision models. This study shows why, and to some extent how. Preferences are necessarily ambiguous and unstable. Rationality is a regulating myth which has had a profound influence on Western conceptions of what an actor is.The aim of this study is to help individual actors understand the theoretical grounds of their actions. The analysis provides tools for examining decision methods and preference changes. The paper presents classical decision theory, taking rational decision theory as a starting point. This theory is analyzed and contrasted with four other models. The results are synthesized into a schema which summarizes the relationship between actor, purposes, and methods of action. The study identifies preferences as a critical premise common to all models. Rational models are based on the premise that preferences are absolute, unambiguous and stable over time. This premise does not hold. On the contrary, preferences are dynamic, ambiguous, and relative, and actors strategically use and amplify these features. The research questions are: What are preferences? and: Why do actors change their preferences? These fairly general questions justify rejecting field studies in favour of an interdisciplinary approach. Sources employed are everyday experience and research literature. The first question is given a hermeneutic answer. Preferences are mental and evaluating states. This makes it possible to conceive of actors as subjects and creators of meaning. The second question is answered by a dozen motives, such as self-control, identity formation and environmental adaptation. These motives, it is suggested, condition human preference change as such, and thus cannot be reduced to preferences. Together, the two answers explain and justify something rational models cannot: why actors change their preferences. Also, they authorize the use of non-rational decision models.Moreover, since the concept of preferences is entangled with the concept of being an actor, the notion of a rational actor is called into question. This concern is carried back to more fundamental assumptions about the source and ontology of preferences, as well as the actor's identity over time. Rationality is brought into historic and mythic perspective, and is questioned as a norm.