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8 Uppsatser om Bonuses, - Sida 1 av 1

Skandia och bonusdebatten: En studie av medias porträttering av Skandia-affärerna och dess påverkan på bonusdebatten

The purpose of this paper is to perform an in-depth analysis on how the events that took place in Skandia AB during the end of the 1990s have been portrayed in media, and how this has affected the general debate concerning bonuses and incentive plans. The paper studies relevant newspaper articles published in Sweden?s largest business newspaper, Dagens Industri (DI), over a period ranging from 2002 to 2008. The major findings of this paper include that bonuses are widely used as incentives in Swedish companies and that the issue of bonuses as an incentive form has lead to a prevalent debate. Furthermore, the questionable events that took place in Skandia AB during the end of 1990s have affected the general debate concerning bonuses.

Do CEOs Get Paid for Performance?

Agency theory describes the conflict of interest between the principal (stockholders) and the agent (CEO). Aligning the incentives of executives with those of the owners is the most direct way to mitigate the agency problem. If there is no meaningful link between CEO compensation and company performance, it is doubtful that the large sums of assets in public corporations are being managed efficiently. In theory the solution is simple reward the CEO when shareholders wealth increases. The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is a relationship between company performance and CEO compensation among Swedish companies, in materials and information technology industry.

Do CEOs Get Paid for Performance?

Agency theory describes the conflict of interest between the principal (stockholders) and the agent (CEO). Aligning the incentives of executives with those of the owners is the most direct way to mitigate the agency problem. If there is no meaningful link between CEO compensation and company performance, it is doubtful that the large sums of assets in public corporations are being managed efficiently. In theory the solution is simple reward the CEO when shareholders wealth increases. The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is a relationship between company performance and CEO compensation among Swedish companies, in materials and information technology industry.

Bonusar : Mot ett långsiktigt tänkande

Background: The background explains different financial crises and the effect those crises had on the Swedish acquits regarding variable compensation. The resent discussion regarding variable compensation and the main problems with bonuses is also explained. Our theories for this essay is mainly based on the new directions from Finansinspektionen FFFS 2009:6,7 and stakeholder theory. Other theories used are agency theory, stewardship theory and economic man.Purpose: The purpose of this essay is to analyze the new directions for variable compensation and to investigate if these new directions can lead to a more long-term thinking for managers in banks. Method: We used semi-structured interviews with open questions for our survey.

Styrmedel för att hantera kreditrisk: En fallstudie av Handelsbanken Sergel

The Swedish bank Handelsbanken has, according to their own way of measuring, been more successful than a weighted average of their competitors during the last 38 years. They have also handled the recent financial crisis, as well as the one in the 1990´s, better than most other banks. This paper studies their management control system at branch level in order to identify the controls which have been enforced to ensure that a low risk level is retained in the lending. The controls that have been identified are; (1) A decentralized organization with the offices as profit centers where the manager has restrictions regarding risk level and the results are measured as K/I (cost/revenue). (2) The absence of bonuses and individual follow-up regarding performance measurement.

Belöningssystem : - en studie av börsnoterade företags rörliga ersättningssystem

AbstractMaster Thesis in business administration, School of Business and Economics at the Linneaus University, financial control, spring 2010Authors:Stefan Hellman and Ewa Warnquist Supervisor:Magnus Willesson Title: Reward systems - a study of public companies? variable compensation system Background:Our interest of the variable compensation system in public companies was brought by the recent extensive discussions of bonuses in the time of a financial crisis. This has led to that the word bonus has been given a negative connotation and we wanted to find out how the system of variable compensation is structured in the companies at Stockholm Stock Exchange. Problem:How is the variable compensation system structured in public companies? Purpose:The purpose of this paper is to study how the variable compensation in public companies is structured.

Ersättningsnivåer - En studie av fast och rörlig lön till verkställande direktörer i svenska börsnoterade företag åren 2001 till 2005

Background and problem: Whether or not the pay to executives is fair is widely debated. During the last years especially the variable pay has been in the spotlight. But at what levels are the compensations really at? Media?s focus is mainly on the absolute highest compensations which may result in a skew view on pay-for-performance incentives.Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to establish the levels of compensation to executives in a wide range of randomly selected companies listed on the Stockholm stock exchange during the years 2001 to 2005. Furthermore, the impact of a set of firm specific variables on compensation levels will be analyzed with basis in several hypothesis.Delimitations: The variable pay considered in this thesis will only be variable cash bonuses.

Kodens påverkan på börskurser : En event study på publiceringen av bolagsstyrningsrapporter enligt Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning

Recent accounting scandals, often led by managers trying to improve results and thereby their own Bonuses, have severely damaged the publics view of management. In the aftermath of scandals such as Enron, Parmalat and Skandia, demand has increased for Corporate Governance codes and similar regulation. The Swedish code for Corporate Governance came into effect on July 1, 2005. The code requires all Swedish companies listed on the Swedish Stock Exchange (OMX A- and O-list), with a turnover exceeding 3 billion SEK, to disclose a report regarding Corporate Governance, attached to the annual report.The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the new disclosure required by the Swedish Corporate Governance code will have a measurable effect on stock prices. The authors have applied event study methodology examining daily returns around the announcement of the Corporate Governance reports.