Gränsdragningsproblemet i luck egalitarianism

Sammanfattning

The purpose of my study is to investigate whether luck egalitarianism can be savedfrom its inability to draw a line between risks which can reasonably be expected to beavoided, and risk which can not. Such a demarcation is of particular importance forthis influential theory of distributive justice, since it serves to judge whether a personis entitled to compensation for a bad outcome of a taken risk, or not. Testing theintuitiveness and coherence of various contending principles for how to separateavoidable risks from unavoidable ones, I conclude that luck egalitarianism seemsunable to draw a clear line between the two kinds of risks. Instead the theory appearsto be dependent on conceptions of a 'normal life', making it remarkably vague.Furthermore, I argue that luck egalitarianism seems unable to manage without takingsufficientarian and utilitarian concerns into account, for the purpose of decidingwhich risks are avoidable, and which are not.