The Determinants and Impacts of Executive Stock Options
Cross-Sectional DataExecutive Stock OptionsFirm PerformanceDiscretionary AccrualsAgency TheoryManagement of enterprisesFöretagsledningManagementBusiness and Economics
The thesis main objective is to establish the determinants for granting executive stock options and to examine their impact on performance for firms listed on OMXS30. The analysis is based on accounting data gathered from annual reports and Thomson Datastream. The empirical results display that firms grant stock options to mitigate the principal-agent problem. Furthermore, risk proves to be positively significant with executive stock options, implying that either executives increase the level of risk after being granted stock options or influence the decision of the remuneration towards stock options when the firm increase the level of risk, in purpose to boost the expected value of their options. No relation between executive stock options and firm performance could be established.