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3 Uppsatser om Distributive - Sida 1 av 1

Revisorns oberoende i förhandlingen med klienten : Vilken betydelse har relationen?

Aim: Earlier studies have investigated what impact the relationship between the auditor and their clients have on the auditor?s objectivity. There are different opinions about whether a close relationship harms or promote the auditors work. Furthermore there are studies that show what strategies the auditor (and client) tends to use in the negotiation between the two of them. On this basis we have chosen to study if there are any correlation between the nature of the auditor client relationship, the auditor?s negotiation strategy against the client and the auditor?s objectivity.Method: Because of our purpose to study if there is any correlation between the relationship, the negotiation strategies and the auditor´s objectivity we have chosen to implement a quantitative survey.

Non-Identity. Att undkomma ett moralfilosofiskt moment 22

Can we harm future people? According to our commonly used contractarian theories, it seems we cannot. This is because our actions of today not only influence what they are supposed to influence, but also who mates with whom and when, and thus which particular persons will ever live in the future. Had we not performed a particular action, the future people born as a result of that same action, would not have been born. It therefore seems they cannot reasonably reject our actions.

Gränsdragningsproblemet i luck egalitarianism

The purpose of my study is to investigate whether luck egalitarianism can be savedfrom its inability to draw a line between risks which can reasonably be expected to beavoided, and risk which can not. Such a demarcation is of particular importance forthis influential theory of Distributive justice, since it serves to judge whether a personis entitled to compensation for a bad outcome of a taken risk, or not. Testing theintuitiveness and coherence of various contending principles for how to separateavoidable risks from unavoidable ones, I conclude that luck egalitarianism seemsunable to draw a clear line between the two kinds of risks. Instead the theory appearsto be dependent on conceptions of a 'normal life', making it remarkably vague.Furthermore, I argue that luck egalitarianism seems unable to manage without takingsufficientarian and utilitarian concerns into account, for the purpose of decidingwhich risks are avoidable, and which are not..