Background and problem: Corporate Governance is a well-known phenomenon which has been the focus of plenty of research where the board of directors and the CEO have been regarded as important actors. What's affecting decisions regarding these actors has been debated whereas media has been pointed out of having an impact. To decide whether or not media can affect Corporate Governance have shown to be problematic whereas it exists divergent views regarding this. At the same time this relationship is more explored in other contexts than the swedish one, although this one is considered suitable for this. Consequently there is a motive for examining medias impact on Corporate Governance in Sweden. Purpose: The purpose of the thesis is to explain if media has an impact on Corporate Governance at an overall level.

Background and problem: Corporate Governance is a well-known phenomenon which has been the focus of plenty of research where the board of directors and the CEO have been regarded as important actors. What's affecting decisions regarding these actors has been debated whereas media has been pointed out of having an impact. To decide whether or not media can affect Corporate Governance have shown to be problematic whereas it exists divergent views regarding this. At the same time this relationship is more explored in other contexts than the swedish one, although this one is considered suitable for this. Consequently there is a motive for examining medias impact on Corporate Governance in Sweden. Purpose: The purpose of the thesis is to explain if media has an impact on Corporate Governance at an overall level.

The recent development in several countries? legislation and best practice recommendations in relation to corporate governance in general and audit committees in particular have affected Swedish listed corporations in the form of the Swedish Corporate Governance Code and the coming EU-directive. This paper aims to discover what factors affected Swedish listed companies to form audit committees when this was entirely voluntary. We collected data from the annual reports of 121 Swedish listed companies and formed eleven hypotheses as to what factors we believed affected the voluntary formation of audit committees based on Agency Theory, economies of scale and circumstances specific to the Swedish environment. We then analyzed the data through the use of a multivariate logistic regression model.

Bakgrund: Många företagsskandaler har drabbat ett flertal länder runt om i världen och det är en av orsakerna till att många länder har skapat koder för bolagsstyrning. Sverige är inte heller förskonat från skandaler och uppmärksamheten kring bolagsstyrningsfrågor har intensifierats på senare tid. Kodgruppen, en grupp tillsatt av regeringen, skapade Svensk Kod för Bolagsstyrning som trädde i kraft den 1 juli 2005. Koden har bl a som syfte att ge riktlinjer för bolagets rapportering till kapitalmarknad och ägare.Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att granska 50 bolagsstyrningsrapporter och i dem ta fram de vanligaste avvikelserna från Koden och de mest frekventa förklaringarna till dessa. Vidare undersöks graden av tydlighet i informationen i bolagsstyrningsrapporterna avseende Kodens tillämpning hos de berörda företagen.

Purpose: To examine the governance mechanisms and the competence PE-firms adds to theirholding companies through an active ownership in order to create growth.Methodology: A qualitative study with interviews as its main source of data.Theoretical perspectives: Corporate governance and relevant theories within that subjectsuch as agent theory, board of directors and management. Previous research within the subjectwill also be presented.Empirical foundation: The empirical foundation consists of three conducted interviews anddata collected from the chosen PE-firms as well as six different holding companies.Conclusions: The governance mechanisms used in the PE-firms we have chosen are stronglyrelated to both theories within corporate governance as well as previous research on thesubject. The governance mechanisms being used are an explicit owners agenda and strategy, athorough acquisition process, usage of external competence, active ownership through theboard of directors and the insertion of incentive systems..

Corporate governance intensified due to the corporate scandals in the USA which led to a new law the so called Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).In 2005 the "Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning" (The Code) was introduced. The main purpose of The Code is to strengthen the confidence in Swedish companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The Code focuses on the working process of boards. The rules set by The Code places higher demands on the board.  Among many other duties the board has to establish long term operational goals and strategy.

The accounting scandals that have attracted attention in recent years have led to internal control becoming a more central part of business activity. Doubts about what firms actually do have increased, all caused by the attention of accounting scandals. To counter this, frameworks and laws evolved and gained a significant role in the organization and its surroundings. The aim of the present study is to find out how four companies in the Kristianstad region are working to ensure its internal control and how they work to minimize risk and reduce uncertainty. We have used a qualitative method and interviewed a person in a senior position in each company.

The purpose of this study explains the relationship between corporate governance and the auditor's role in Swedish family firms with the definitions micro, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and how this relationship is affected by the firms strategy. The study is based on a survey sent out to 3000 Swedish SMEs, of which 280 responses from family firms could be used. Our findings showed that the auditor in the family firms didn?t have a specific role or contributed added value to the firm, and that the strategy didn?t affect the outcome. Furthermore, we found correlation between the perceptions of the auditor's role and added value depending on the family firms type of corporate governance.

Corporate governance intensified due to the corporate scandals in the USA which led to a new law the so called Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).In 2005 the "Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning" (The Code) was introduced. The main purpose of The Code is to strengthen the confidence in Swedish companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The Code focuses on the working process of boards. The rules set by The Code places higher demands on the board.  Among many other duties the board has to establish long term operational goals and strategy.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the networks of interlocking directors in the 50 largestSwedish companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange during the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005and 2010 and seek explanations for the observed developments.Our findings indicate that the density and concentration of the network has decreased during thefirst ten-year period and stayed constant during the second period. The development of theoverall network is not consistent throughout all corporate groups. Most notablyHandelsbankssfären seems to experience increased density and connectivity whileWallenbergsfären is experiencing the reverse.The changes during the first ten-year period is deemed to come mainly from changes inregulations pertaining to both the opening for international capital investments as well as looserrestrictions on domestic capital investments. These changes have caused decreased concentrationof ownership, as well as the emergence of new owners, which is reflected in the board ofdirectors.During the second ten-year period the changes are more pertaining to the individual boards andboard members, without flowing through into the overall network. Our findings indicate thatthese changes are caused by the increased professionalization of boards and board work, whichhas gained momentum through the creation of the Swedish Corporate Governance Code..

Uppsatsen redogör för ett revisionsutskotts arbetsuppgifter, redogörför revisionsutskottens arbete i företag noterade på stockholmsbörsens A-lista samt att analysera om revisionsutskotten i fråga arbetar enligt svensk kod för bolagsstyrning och därmed bidrar till bättre corporate governance.

A new code for corporate governance was introduced for major companies in Sweden in July 2005. This act is to some degree a follower to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that was introduced in the U.S.A. after the Enron scandal. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the effect on the controller in response to the introduction of this new act. Three controllers in major Swedish companies was interviewed and asked if and how they had been affected by this new act.

Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka vilka svårigheter ett svenskt företag kan möta när de ska implementera sitt Code of Conduct hos leverantörer i Kina. Vi ska även ge förslag på hur implementeringsprocessen av Code of Conduct kan underlättas..

We would like to learn more about how the restrictive policy against incentive programmes affects the board’s of Swedish state owned commercial firms ability to govern management in an efficient way. We also want to find out if there are different consequences in reference to this that are not directly linked to corporate governance issues. Our empiric observations have been made in order to profoundly explore the subject and examine it through the eyes of professional individuals, all expressing different views and standpoints. We conclude that the most efficient structure is when an active board is complemented by a well structured and individualised incentive programme. However, this thesis conclude that this structure is not possible given the current guidelines and policies employed by the state, which in turn might lead to sub optimizations in the governing..

We would like to learn more about how the restrictive policy against incentive programmes affects the board?s of Swedish state owned commercial firms ability to govern management in an efficient way. We also want to find out if there are different consequences in reference to this that are not directly linked to corporate governance issues. Our empiric observations have been made in order to profoundly explore the subject and examine it through the eyes of professional individuals, all expressing different views and standpoints. We conclude that the most efficient structure is when an active board is complemented by a well structured and individualised incentive programme.