Dr. Robert A. Pape utgav sin bok Bombing to win: Air power and coercion in wars år 1996. Det är en kvantitativ analys där Pape?s målsättning är att presentera en teori som beskriver hur luftmakt skall användas för att lyckas och testa den mot alla strategiska luftoperationer under 1900-talet.

24 mars 1999 påbörjar NATO för första gången i organisationens historia krigshandlingar med luftstridskrafter. Detta mot ett Serbien med Slobodan Milosevic i spetsen som utförde etniska rensningar på kosovoalbaner i Kosovo. Denna konflikt kom att från NATOs håll kallas operation Allied Force. Tre år innan denna konflikt urartade släppte Dr. Robert A.

Dr. Robert A. Pape publicerar 1996 boken Bombing to Win. Kvantitativa studier av 33 konflikter där luftstridskrafter använts har genomförts. Detta för att söka ett samband mellan lyckade respektive misslyckade slutresultat.

There are several competing views on how to best utilize air power. Following his quantitative study of air power, Robert Pape developed a theory which focuses on undermining the target state's military strategy. According to Pape it is possible to explain the outcome as a result of military vulnerability. This essay seeks to determine if Pape's theory can predict the outcome of Operation Unified Protector. By using a mixed methods approach on four hypotheses, it will be determined if the operation was a successful case of coercion, if NATO acted according to Pape's model and whether this achieved the desired effects or not. The results reveal that the theory could not successfully predict the outcome of the conflict.

Dr. Robert A. Pape utgav sin bok Bombing to win: Air power and coercion in wars år 1996. Det är en kvantitativ analys där Pape?s målsättning är att presentera en teori som beskriver hur luftmakt skall användas för att lyckas och testa den mot alla strategiska luftoperationer under 1900-talet.

There are several competing views on how to best utilize air power. Following his quantitative study of air power, Robert Pape developed a theory which focuses on undermining the target state's military strategy. According to Pape it is possible to explain the outcome as a result of military vulnerability. This essay seeks to determine if Pape's theory can predict the outcome of Operation Unified Protector. By using a mixed methods approach on four hypotheses, it will be determined if the operation was a successful case of coercion, if NATO acted according to Pape's model and whether this achieved the desired effects or not. The results reveal that the theory could not successfully predict the outcome of the conflict.

Dr. Robert A. Pape gav 1996 ut sin bok Bombing to Win ? Airpower and Coercion in War där han presenterar sin teori om hur luftmakt bäst ska användas för att påtvinga sin vilja över en motståndares. Genom empiriska studier argumenterar han för att strategisk bombning inte fungerar utan luftstridskrafterna ska istället användas till att bekämpa fiendens militära strategi.Detta självständiga arbete presenterar kärnan ur Pape's teori, samt tar ut tre centrala kriterier som verkar sammanfattande för teorin och undersöker sedan om det går att urskilja dessa inom Nato's nyttjandet av luftmakt under Operation Deliberate Force i Bosnien 1995.

No-fly Zones have been used in three recent conflicts. For every intervention the time taken to achieve the end-state has decreased. It took twelve years in Iraq, three years in Bosnia and only nine months in Libya. NATO was part of the intervention in both Bosnia and Libya, facing almost the same size of opponent, but it took them four times longer to achieve the end-state in Bosnia compared to Libya. The purpose of this essay is to analyze this difference in the time taken to achieve the end-state with a structured focused comparison of Bosnia and Libya based on Robert Pape´s theory of coercion with a focus on No-fly Zones. The results show that the mandate can explain the difference. In Libya NATO had the opportunity, due to the mandate, to use pre-emptive strikes, which they did not have in Bosnia.

When are aerial bombing strategies effective in coercing target states? According to the recent research debate there is a consensus that denial strategies may be an effective instrument for coercing states to change their politics. This study is based on Belkin?s theory which argues that the effectiveness of denial strategies may depend in part on the domestic legitimacy of the target states? regimes. From a political standpoint, aerial denial effectiveness can be considered more likely to coerce when political leaders of target states lack domestic legitimacy rather than when they are legitimate.   The purpose of this study is to contribute an explanation of a condition where denial strategies are more likely to succeed.