Mitt examensarbete går ut på att undersöka möjligheterna att förenkla de moment inom den traditionella färskvirkestekniken som är tidskrävande utan att tillföra något till uttrycket. Syftet för arbetet är möjliggöra snabba beslut för att underlätta en inspirerande arbetsprocess där formen skapas samtidigt som produkten.Jag har utgått ifrån maskinverkstaden på Carl Malmsten Furiture Studies och tillverkat en ställbar borrmall där olika vinklar på ett snabbt sätt kan ställas in och där ämnet kan spännas fast trots att det är assymetriskt. Jag har i samarbete med Ulf Bengtsson, forskningsingenjör på IEI vid Linköpings universitet, utvecklat en fräsmall till en handöverfräs för att tillverka tappar. För att ta fram arbetsmaterial till tester av mallarna har jag för hand kluvit fram och sedan täljt träämnen..

The problem area was identified due to the fact that research within internal audit is fragmented and insufficient, simultaneously to internal audit becoming more common in the public debate. Crises and scandals in companies such as Enron in the US and Skandia in Sweden have resulted in new regulations regarding how companies should be governed. These regulations have been established in Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in the US, and in Sweden the Swedish code for corporate governance will be implemented in 2005. The regulations imply that companies must provide sound internal control and to accomplish that, companies should have an auditing and consulting internal audit function. The Swedish code for corporate governance denotes that companies can decide to comply or explain why the code is not complied.

With the introduction of the Swedish Code for Corporate Governance in December 2004, most companies listed on the major Swedish stock exchanges were required to have a nomination committee responsible for, among other things, evaluating the incumbent board and nominating new candidates. This master thesis aims at analyzing the effects of these nomination committees on institutional investors in their corporate governance, through a qualitative study of 13 interviews. We have found that institutional investors have become more active through their participation in nomination committees and that they have gained more influence over the companies in which they own shares. We believe that in reality nomination committees have more influence over the selection of the board than was intended when the Swedish Code was written..

Uppsatsen syftar till att med hjälp av de begrepp, vilka kretsar kring företagsansvar, utforska den nya typen av socialt ansvarstagande, benämnt GCC. Författarna lyfter fram tre svenska multinationella företag och undersöker hur de tar ett socialt ansvar i förhållande till GCC. Företag kan genom att tillämpa GCC, adressera makroproblem och i samband med detta generera vinst. Samarbete och driven ledare är nyckelord i dessa sammanhang..

Due to a rising debate concerning corporate governance that has caused increasing demands for companies? transparency, several codes of conduct have been introduced. The Swedish Code for Corporate Governance is obliged to companies with a turnover exceeding three billions. There are companies that voluntarily apply the Swedish Code. Possible causes to this phenomenon ought to be that the code for corporate governance conveys legitimacy through the insight into the affairs of a company the public receives, through the report of the corporate governance that is published in the annual report and on the home page of the company.

This paper examines the interpersonal and intercorporate networks of interlocking boardmembers among Sweden's 50 largest publicly traded companies in 1985 and 2005. We find that both the interpersonal and intercorporate networks of 1985 are considerably more coherent and densely connected than those of 2005. The observed changes in social network structure are compared to changes in company ownership in Swedish publicly traded companies during the same period, and it is found that the observed changes in network density and cohesion can be related to a notable increase in the number of foreign board members. These results imply that the social organization of the Swedish system of corporate governance has changed notably during the period. Social network theory suggests that these changes can explain the greater demand for external regulation, decreased homogeneity of board members and increase in board member compensation observed under the period.

Who has the ownership of a company´s long-term strategy, and who should have it? Is it the board of directors or the senior management? Swedish law and regulations seemingly point in one direction, whereas the findings of studying the relationship between CEO and chairman of the board in eleven Swedish listed large- and mid-cap companies, point the other way. In a majority of the companies the senior management have the ownership of the long term strategy whilst the board of directors merely hold a control function. The possible effects on the companies managed as well as the rules and regulations they are managed according to, are analyzed..

This paper is a study of corporate governances in the municipal of Stockholm. The purpose of this paper is to enlighten the problems and opportunities for the corporate governances of the wards in the municipal of Stockholm. The municipal of Stockholm is made up of 18 relatively self-governing wards, whose activities bear a resemblance to one and other. Therefore we have specified our survey to corporate governances in the ward of Skarpnäck (Skarpnäcks stadsdel), to be able to use this ward as an example to corporate governances in the entire municipal of Stockholm. The essay emanates from the important management theories: Budget, Integrated Management system (ILS), Benchmarking and Balanced Scorecard.The essay is based on interviews and a poll survey we conducted in the administration of the ward of Skarpnäck, and also based on interviews with Stockholm?s city hall.

The accounting scandals that have attracted attention in recent years have led to internal control becoming a more central part of business activity. Doubts about what firms actually do have increased, all caused by the attention of accounting scandals. To counter this, frameworks and laws evolved and gained a significant role in the organization and its surroundings. The aim of the present study is to find out how four companies in the Kristianstad region are working to ensure its internal control and how they work to minimize risk and reduce uncertainty. We have used a qualitative method and interviewed a person in a senior position in each company.

We would like to learn more about how the restrictive policy against incentive programmes affects the board’s of Swedish state owned commercial firms ability to govern management in an efficient way. We also want to find out if there are different consequences in reference to this that are not directly linked to corporate governance issues. Our empiric observations have been made in order to profoundly explore the subject and examine it through the eyes of professional individuals, all expressing different views and standpoints. We conclude that the most efficient structure is when an active board is complemented by a well structured and individualised incentive programme. However, this thesis conclude that this structure is not possible given the current guidelines and policies employed by the state, which in turn might lead to sub optimizations in the governing..

In the recent years auditing scandals all around the world, deficient internal control has attracted a lot of attention. This has contributed to further requirements on insight and internal control. Those scandals have seriously damaged the auditor?s profession and contributed to a reduced trust among the public. Therefore an extensive work to recover and stringed the trust was started all around the world.

Vårt examensarbete beskriver och analyserar hur den interna kontrollen är utformad i några utvalda företag samt hur användandet av intern kontroll skiljer sig åt företagen emellan. I studien jämförs företag med varierande storlek och ägarstruktur som styrs av olika regleringar. Uppsatsen har sin utgångspunkt i COSO:s ramverk där vi utifrån ramverket diskuterar företagens kontrollmiljö, riskbedömning, kontrollaktiviteter, kommunikation och uppföljning. Vi har vidare diskuterat andra relevanta teorier och normgivare. Exempelvis innebörden av internrevision, intern kontroll och corporate governance samt de lagar och regler som styr företags interna kontroll..

This study test the short-termism of companies listed on the market OMX Stockholm 30. We will use a deductive point of view where the purpose of this study is to investigate whether corporate short-term returns can be explained by the independent variables related to corporate governance and compensation practices. This is to investigate whether there is an intentional action on raising the short-term return in order to achieve a higher CEO compensation. In the study, theories dealing with corporate governance and agency theory have resulted in two hypotheses. Basic Hypothesis H1 is: if short-termism of Swedish industry due to the company's short-term returns can be explained by the independent variables related to the company's management and compensation. This hypothesis could not be verified through the quantitative study. Alternative Hypothesis H2 is: the compensation of a CEO can be explained by the independent variables related to company performance and size.

We would like to learn more about how the restrictive policy against incentive programmes affects the board?s of Swedish state owned commercial firms ability to govern management in an efficient way. We also want to find out if there are different consequences in reference to this that are not directly linked to corporate governance issues. Our empiric observations have been made in order to profoundly explore the subject and examine it through the eyes of professional individuals, all expressing different views and standpoints. We conclude that the most efficient structure is when an active board is complemented by a well structured and individualised incentive programme.

This study test the short-termism of companies listed on the market OMX Stockholm 30. We will use a deductive point of view where the purpose of this study is to investigate whether corporate short-term returns can be explained by the independent variables related to corporate governance and compensation practices. This is to investigate whether there is an intentional action on raising the short-term return in order to achieve a higher CEO compensation. In the study, theories dealing with corporate governance and agency theory have resulted in two hypotheses. Basic Hypothesis H1 is: if short-termism of Swedish industry due to the company's short-term returns can be explained by the independent variables related to the company's management and compensation. This hypothesis could not be verified through the quantitative study. Alternative Hypothesis H2 is: the compensation of a CEO can be explained by the independent variables related to company performance and size.